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Abstract:  
 The goal of this paper is to suggest that theoretical thinking with respect to metaphysical 
determinations or indeterminations is not the appropriate realm for attributing moral responsibility. On the 
contrary, judgments that attribute moral responsibility (S is responsible for...) depend on the possibility that a 
rational narrative be built. Agents are capable of forging their future actions, as well as of reflecting upon past 
actions. With this it will also be shown how we assume control of our behavior because we ignore whether 
actions are the result of causality or chance. It is claimed that contexts determine the degree of causal demand in 
narratives that attribute moral responsibility. In order to construct this type of narrative one must focus on a 
specific link in the causal chain of explanations. If context alone is not demanding enough so as to require that 
theoretical reflections strive for the ultimate foundation of our actions, then the agent may be considered 
responsible for his behavior.  
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1. Introduction 
 At first sight, the problem of moral responsibility is based on two conditions: 
(a) Actions must be a product of the intentionality of the agent  
 (b) It has to be known which action caused which consequences  
 Indeed, from a theoretical point of view it can be argued that for a person to be 
responsible for an action, said person has to have had some control over the consequence of 
the action. At the same time it is possible to establish which action caused which event. Both 
conditions find their axis in the problem of determinism, which consists in whether there is 
moral responsibility even when human actions are not free ‒that is to say, the agents not 
being able to choose between different options for their behavior. Compatibilist theories 
claim that moral responsibility is possible even though the determinism is true
1
. On the other 
hand, incompatibilist theories claim that moral responsibility is not compatible with 
determinism
2
.  
  There are numerous arguments for and against both positions. Unfortunately, there is 
no room in this paper to even begin to recapitulate the extended and extremely convoluted 
discussion between compatibilism and incompatibilism. Fortunately, what matters for present 
purposes are not the details but rather the general character of the discussion: in what 
contexts can a cause be decisive when attempting to attribute moral responsibility? It is this 
that will be considered in the following sections.   
This paper will argue that moral responsibility is constituted through a narrative of the 
human actions and not by means of a metaphysic of alternate possibilities. Furthermore, this 
paper will show that said narratives have some moral value given that theses narratives could 
exclude the problem of our actions being metaphysically determined. Thus, the neo-Kantian 
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thesis which states that there is a difference between regarding people from a theoretical 
perspective than from a practical one can be accepted. In a practical context agents can 
attribute moral responsibility because they assume that the metaphysical causes do not have a 
direct and significant impact on our way of being. However, the metaphysical causes are 
relevant when we examine philosophically demanding contexts on human behavior.  
It can be suspected that if a person knew with certainty that our actions are causally 
determined, the relationship with the moral values would be completely different as to how 
we nowadays conceive it. However, this suspicion implies a respect for a hierarchy: that the 
moral sphere depends on the metaphysical sphere in such way that a change in the paradigm 
of one of them involves a change in the paradigm of the other. Anyhow, it is not necessary to 
delve further in metaphysical assumptions –especially if it is accepted that context decides 
how far back we ought to look for causes of an agent‟s behavior3. 
Waller (2011) has recently claimed that the present scientific understanding of human 
behavior does not leave space for moral responsibility, and that its abolition is sociologically 
and psychologically desirable and possible
4
. However, said opinion will be discredited 
indirectly throughout this paper. On one hand, it shall be argued that compatibilism is 
possible depending on a context of moral attribution. If the context is not demanding enough 
in such a way that the theoretical reflection goes in search for the final foundation of our 
actions, then the agent can be responsible for his acts. Thus, the attribution of moral 
responsibility will depend on rational explanations that refer to actions as being intentional. 
On the other hand, it shall be explained that the narrative aspect of judgments on moral 
responsibility helps to understand how it is possible that said responsibility be compatible 
with naturalism without considering, as Waller claims, that it is based on some miraculous 
power.  
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 Cfr., Hawthorne (2001), to whom the same action can be both free and un-free (depending on the attributor‟s 
context) 
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It will be not proposed that moral responsibility depends on whether there is an 
absence of control, but rather that a person is able to rationally create a narration from which 
the agent could be capable of both forging future actions and reflecting on past actions.   
 
2. Compatibilism and Incompatibilsm 
 There exists an ancient skeptic dilemma that claims that subjects cannot be 
responsible for their actions. The dilemma is the following:  
1. If our acts are causally determined, then we are not responsible for them. 
2. If our acts are not causally determined, then we are not responsible for them. 
3. In consequence, we are not responsible for our acts.   
 Since the conclusion seems unacceptable, this reasoning has been addressed by 
accepting the first premise and disambiguating the second premise in such a way that the idea 
of "cause" does not imply an absolute loss of the freedom to act (e.g. Chisholm, 1966). 
According to Inwagen (1983), moral responsibility requires that our actions be, at some point, 
undetermined. Therefore, actions must be voluntary for a person to be responsible for them. 
Were determinism true in two possible worlds (M and M’) in which the same laws of nature 
are true, then M would be exactly equivalent to M’ in any given t moment, and in any future 
moment regarding t. For the determinist, acts are conditioned counterfactually, meaning that 
the laws and the early history of the world are enough to determine the later history
5
. Given 
that a person is not responsible for what happens before birth, a person will not be 
responsible for what will happen in the future. Since there is an unavoidable future in regards 
to moral responsibility there is neither the best nor the worst of the possible worlds.  
However, the first premise implies that the agents could choose between alternative 
acts and that, facing equal acts, those agents can be projected successfully by different 
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possible worlds. This position is represented by the following principle: an agent is morally 
responsible for what he has done only if he could have done it in any other way; S is 
responsible for an act A if he had the option of not doing A. In the same way, a person is 
responsible for not doing a determined act only if he could have done it, since the conditions 
of moral responsibility are connected to both acts and omissions
6
.   
 It is not a proposition shared by the philosophers that moral responsibility excludes 
determinism, especially in cases of metaphysical constraint. There exists, then, another 
strategy to address the aforementioned dilemma, which consists of directly denying the first 
premise. Consider the cases of the Frankfurt Style. A mysterious scientist secretly implants a 
chip in John's brain so as to supervise and control his actions.  Among the things the scientist 
supervises, there is the taste for the products of a certain brand (X). So, if John decides to 
purchase an item of any other brand (Y), the scientist is prepared to intervene by means of 
sophisticated equipment that he has designed to alter the conduct. On the contrary, if John 
decides to purchase the items of X, then the scientist does not intervene and the equipment 
keeps on supervising without affecting John's decisions.  Now, assume that John decides on 
his own (as he would do without the intervention of the scientist), to buy an item of the brand 
X. John would be, then, morally responsible for that choice, even if he could not have chosen 
anything else
7
. 
 Similar cases add up to the compatibilist position
8
. Compatibilists claim that moral 
responsibility is compatible with determinism, insisting that neither the advance of natural 
science nor metaphysical perspectives represent a problem for moral responsibility. Starting 
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  In this case, indeterminism is taken as a synonym of libertarianism, meaning that the earlier is based on the 
latter in a way that, according to both theories, it is necessary some sort of control over our decisions for there to 
exist morally responsible acts (Cfr., Berofsky, 1995, 2006).    
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  So as not to drift away from the objective of the paper, I will leave aside the numerous critics that have 
aroused this type of cases.    
8
 Traditional compatibilism is defined by the conjunction of the following three theses: 1. Free will is essential 
for moral responsibility; 2. Free will requires that there exist alternative possibilities when carrying out an act; 3. 
Moral responsibility is compatible with determinism.  
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from this idea, Fischer (2006) has differentiated the regulative control of actions from 
guidance control
9
. The former encloses a genuine metaphysical access to alternative 
possibilities, while the latter is based on the capacity of the agent to be able to act under 
certain limits. Should moral responsibility obey uniquely to regulative control, then a person 
could expect life to be either a succession of fortunate experiences, or some sort of Greek 
tragedy –even if determinism does not necessarily imply that we have „destinies‟, meaning 
that our choices are inconsequential.  
Continuing with the case of the mysterious scientist, his presence does not make any 
action unavoidable in a world that is completely indeterminist, while in a determinist world 
the presence of the mysterious scientist is superfluous. In this way, and to put it in Fischer´s 
words, the Frankfurt Style cases show that moral responsibility does not require regulative 
control. For that reason, even when there were no such regulative control, there would still be 
guidance control that does not require alternative possibilities such as when a person turns to 
the right with his car, even if he could not, due to technical problems, turn to the left.
10
  
If determinism excludes regulative control, but does not exclude guidance control, 
that is because moral responsibility is based on the capacity of the agents to control their acts: 
both in the capacity to answer to the acts of other agents, as well as the conducts that imply 
mechanisms of rational deliberation. In the same way, John is responsible for many of his 
choices even though he is causally determined by the mysterious scientist. Indeed, guidance 
control refers to the mechanisms inherent to the agents to carry out an act, since it consists in 
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 Strictly speaking, Fischer is a semi-compatibilist, given the fact that he is a compatibilist in what respects to 
the relationship between moral responsibility and determinism; and an incompatibilist in what respects to the 
relationship between determinism and relevant alternatives. In this text, he is taken as a compatibilist since, all 
in all, semi-compatibilism is simply the affirmation of causal determinism being compatible with moral 
responsibility, apart from if causal determinism eliminates the access to relevant alternatives. 
10
 Consider also the classical example of Locke (1992): suppose that a man is moved to a room while he sleeps.  
When he wakes up he sees a person he wants to see and with whom he wants to speak. Suppose, also, that he 
was locked up without his noticing, in such way that he cannot get out.  When he wakes up, he will be happy to 
find the desired company, with whom he will decide to stay. That is to say, he will prefer to stay in there instead 
of going out. Locke wonders: Is this stay voluntary? And he answers that nobody will doubt that it is voluntary, 
even though, considering he has been locked up, it is evident that he has no freedom to decide whether he stays 
or leaves. 
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a type of counterfactual dependency of the actions over reasons or motives. And, according to 
Fischer, a person can find reasons or motives even in a determinist world.     
 Fischer‟s ideas are based on the capacity to perceive oneself and to do things in one’s 
own way ‒after all, guidance control is some sort of valuation of one's expression. For 
example, consider the moment before facing death –of course, if the world is deterministic, 
the way in which we die is determined as well as our reactions towards it. If one agrees with 
Heidegger (1977) and considers death as the last possibility, then it is not difficult to 
speculate over certain existential compatibilism, like Fischer. Death is the last possibility and 
we are causally determined to face it, but there is not one only way to do so. How it is done 
relies on the authenticity and autonomy of the agent. In this way, one is not responsible for 
his own death, but is responsible for the way in which he reacts before it
11
.  
 However, the change of perspective that ranges from alternative possibilities to 
discourses over authenticity does not cover all the cases. Consider the psychological process 
of someone who is an addict against his own will, e.g. someone who wants to quit smoking 
but cannot do so. A smoker struggles against his addiction because he is aware of the health 
problems that it brings with it. But, in some point in his struggle, he stops trying to quit. He 
decides that he cannot keep on struggling and becomes an addict to his own will. So he starts 
to think that, even though his addiction is detrimental to his health, it is not worth to live 
without it and keeps on smoking. Is it possible to say that, after losing the desire to escape his 
addiction, he has now acquired the freedom and the responsibility to continue smoking? 
Therefore, there are times in which living life according to each one's intentions or ways does 
not guarantee that one is responsible for his actions.  
 
3. Betty and Benji cases  
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Consider the following case, extracted from Mele (1995). Betty was a six year old girl 
who was scared of the basement of her house, especially when the lights were out. She did 
not understand why she was scared, since she knew that nothing bad was going to happen to 
her. Then, she believed that her fear was childish and developed a strategy to overcome her 
fear: to go down to the basement periodically until she was not scared anymore.  Betty was in 
control of herself. That allowed her to have a strong personality that helped her whenever she 
had to make choices in her life. Betty is now in charge of a position with a lot of 
responsibility, in which all decisions depend on her. According to Mele, Betty's course of 
action built her character in such a way that she became the person she now is, if we 
presuppose that there are causal chains that start with the intention of the agents. Betty was 
autonomous, since she went down to the basement intentionally as a consequence of her own 
decision. Therefore, and according to Mele, Betty is responsible for not being scared of 
basements nowadays, as well as for her strong personality. Of course, Betty was a child and, 
as every other child, she was influenced by her parents. But her parents' influence minimizes 
neither autonomy nor merit to her attitude. Similarly, the addict to tobacco also plans a 
strategy to overcome his addiction. The success of the strategy will depend on his persistence 
and self-control. The attitude of the addict is, at the beginning, anarchical in an Aristotelian 
way –i.e. his intentional conduct opposes a better judgment– and, for that reason, he does not 
have control over himself. He tries to change it, puts his effort in it, even though he fails by 
falling back into his addiction. As times goes on, he starts to resign himself, to lose faith in 
himself. His judgments start to change in such way that he ends up considering his addiction 
as something that has to be enjoyed in life. All in all, his judgment and course of actions 
coincide. And again, can one say that the addict is now in control over himself? When one is 
capable of making up reasons for which one considers oneself responsible for one's actions, 
one is also capable of making up reasons for which one does not consider oneself responsible. 
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So, this statement seems to suggest that we choose whether to be morally responsible or not 
according to the discourse or story we build of ourselves. 
 It can be considered that, in Betty's case, there is a begging the question because she 
already had a strong personality at the age of six. Waller (2011) compares this case with that 
of her twin brother Benji. Unlike Betty, Benji did not carry out any strategy to overcome his 
fear.  Benji was less sure of himself and, either consciously or unconsciously, avoided going 
to the dark basement. Nowadays Benji has a weak character and a weak personality. He 
usually avoids responsibilities, since he had much less resources to face them than his sister. 
Perhaps Mele is right and such choices have affected them in their subsequent choices in life; 
perhaps a Freudian psychoanalyst sees in it the reason of many of their current attitudes. 
However, and comparing both stories, the problem does not lie in that each one of them had 
the personality that made them be who they are, but in why Betty did overcome her fear and 
Benji did not. Stating why leads to further causes, where Betty's capacity to face 
circumstances similar to Benji ends up being a matter of luck. In this way, Waller concludes 
that Betty and Benji already had several differences before assuming different positions to the 
same problem. She is not responsible for her strong character –like Benji is not responsible 
for his weak character– without her choices miraculously transcending their own causal 
histories. The differences in their developed characters can be recognized without appealing 
to any miraculous transcendence, assuming that they were the product of earlier differences, 
with respect to innate capacities as well as influences that are out of control and for which 
nobody is morally responsible.  
 The investigation of the past as an explanation of the present may result valuable to 
modify conducts or to understand why we do what we do. But, we have to take into account 
that we can always find a reason to be how we are. This is due to the large number of 
cooperating causes that go unnoticed and that are more important than what they seem to be. 
10 
 
Furthermore, those who exclude cooperating causes, by means of explanations, so as to focus 
on a principal cause, do so according to some interest. In this way, someone arrives to a last 
word by excluding many possible last words (Laera, 2011). The main reason why Betty and 
Benji have different characters is referred to as being the product of certain narrative 
constructions that try to explain –according to certain explicit or implicit interests– why 
someone acts the way he does. This kind of reductionism is unavoidable. 
 The story told is always more a simple listing in a serial or sequential order of events, 
because the narrative organizes them into an intelligible whole that can excuse or blame 
someone for their actions and attribute moral responsibility. For example, there are stories 
that defeat presumptions of responsibility. These narrative constructions or stories can be 
called excuses and can apply in some cases but not in all. To be plausible, excuses must be 
found as socially acceptable. A murderer cannot evade his responsibility by telling a story 
about his genes. In these contexts the biological implication, as well as metaphysical 
implication, are irrelevant. Thus, agents can claim responsibility –or a lack of responsibility– 
for their actions depending on their relevant history, and this constitutes what we grasp 
simply as being responsibility.        
 It could be objected that all social narratives entail certain metaphysics. Suppose that 
the narrative mentions counterfactual situations: “When Betty was seventeen years old, she 
could have gone to Brandeis, but she chose to go to Harvard”. How are we going to interpret 
such counterfactual claims? We have to bring in some metaphysical idea of possibilities, to 
make sense of the narrative. However, the use of the subjunctive form does not imply the 
reference to metaphysical possibilities, and much less a hierarchy between moral narrative 
and metaphysical accounts. It can still conceive metaphysical possibilities as a mode of 
narration and establish a hierarchy with a moral narrative depending on the attribution 
context. 
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The narratives that imply moral responsibility can be built by focusing either in the 
third person or in oneself. It is possible to support Mele's inner indeterminism by creating 
narratives focused in the intentional capacity of the agents in connection with their 
autonomous being. But it is also possible to take into account other cooperating causes to 
conceive them as principal causes, so as to focus the narrative in the environmental 
conditions and minimize the importance of the characteristic of being autonomous. 
Characterizing moral responsibility as a way of narrative explains why the reasons of an 
action are so versatile. Being versatile means that, hermeneutically, there is an intentional 
orientation when one is looking for responsibilities: a request is not a request, nor is a 
demand a demand; one can opt to say no.  
 Assume that somebody builds a narrative that includes the assumption that social 
order determines the conduct of the agents. According to this conception, if S was to commit 
a crime, the reason will not lie in the individual who executed the action, but ultimately in 
circumstances that do not depend on the agent –this could even serve as an extenuating 
circumstance. Now, another person changes the hermeneutic context and takes into account 
more proximate causes, such as the hate that the murderer felt for his victim. Or course, both 
are in disagreement, since they have different criteria of responsibility. One is a narrative 
going back to the criterion that the origin of every action is outside the agent –where the 
ultimate cause of committing a crime can be social injustice, inequality of possibilities or the 
personality of the agent, etc. The other resorts to a criterion that takes as an origin the 
autonomy of the agent to decide for himself. For such disagreements to be epistemically 
authentic, they have to share the same conceptual frame. That is to say, they have to share the 
subject they are referring to. The point in common is that both are inscribed within the frame 
of a narrative that includes, either explicitly or implicitly, judgments of moral responsibility.    
 When there are disagreements, the context of epistemic evaluation plays a decisive 
12 
 
role for one narrative to prevail over the other. The evidence that supports propositions in 
which S is morally responsible (e.g. “John knows that S is responsible for...”) answers to 
recognition of the reason of the action. To the extent that, the final causes, the ones which 
exempt the agent from any moral responsibility, do not have a major influence. For instance, 
in criminal law: even though the agent is, to a large degree, determined by social order, he is 
also morally responsible for his actions. Even if the murderer were morally incorrigible, some 
moral evaluation would be attributed to him. However, these conditions have a binding 
influence if anyone attempts to explain the cause of the actions through psychology or 
sociology. And this is possible due to the fact that we have the large capacity to interpret the 
phenomenon of moral responsibility as a unit that entails reductions in contributory causes
12
.  
 Nevertheless, not only does the reduction in causes require a conceptual frame in 
keeping with the past circumstances, but it also requires a narrative process oriented towards 
possible future circumstances and towards the power of prediction. One knows that the 
murderer who does not repent from his crime will probably kill again, because stories of him 
murdering someone may be created and they can be conferred a certain degree of truthfulness.  
When the degree of truthfulness is too high, i.e., that there is a great expectation for him to 
kill, then the story becomes a prediction about the future. But, to what extent can we predict 
the result of our actions? Betty foresaw that she would overcome her fear of darkness in the 
basement with the strategy of going down periodically. Yet Betty could not foresee what kind 
of person she would be when she made that decision, just as Benji could not foresee the long 
term consequences that would arise from ignoring the problem. Therefore, even when Betty 
and Benji shaped themselves when they were six years old, they did not have the intention of 
being who they are now. Consequently, they seem not to be responsible for that. Bearing this 
in mind, the search for responsibilities is measured with a double standard: when the story 
                                            
12
 Cfr., Willaschek (2010) 
13 
 
resorts to history, a precise fact which is distant in time is usually found as causally important 
in order to explain why things happen; on the other hand, when there is an attempt to find out 
the future consequences of the actions, the practical reason is often limited to paying more 
attention to the short term effects than to the long term effects.  
As seen in Betty's case, a story is built about responsibility in which the challenge of 
the basement was the key to shaping her personality, but a story is not built about 
responsibility in which the challenge of the basement will be the key to shaping her 
personality since, in the latter case, there is nothing similar to a deliberate intention. In fact, if 
it is argued that in a deterministic universe we ought to blame people who blame others, we 
thereby assume compatibilism since it could not be fair to blame the blamers otherwise. 
        
4. Story and future consequences 
 Strawson (1994) suggests that there is a requirement of ultimate responsibility that 
cannot be met and that is an essential condition in order to establish that actions are morally 
responsible. According to Strawson, actions entail true responsibility when they are 
performed by virtue of a reason of the agent that causes them. If causal chains –which range 
from our desires, beliefs and values, up to our interactions– were built at random, without a 
basis of rules or epistemology whatsoever, nor by virtue of some kind of control that is 
external to the agent, then there would be no place in which to search for any kind of 
responsibility. Yet, if actions and reasons depended on the agent's own abilities, they should 
be chosen by principles for which, in turn, he should be responsible by other means of choice, 
and so on, ad infinitum. 
 The deterministic idea, as well as the idea of a complete indeterminism, rests on the 
fact that, if the series of causes should be followed until their ultimate source, it would be 
14 
 
clear that our interactions are out of our control
13
. The moral determinists and indeterminists 
conclude that it is unfair to punish some and congratulate others only because of their 
behavior. Ultimately, the abilities for good/bad behavior are the result of either a 
transcendental future or of the goddess of fortune, which gives no grounds for moral 
justification. However, this conclusion presupposes certain compatibility since it would be 
pointless to talk about justice: both punishment and merit would also be determined by 
causality. Assuming one is not dealing with an extreme determinist nor with a complete 
indeterminist but with a skeptic, maybe like Strawson, then the construction of moral stories 
that attribute responsibilities may be arbitrary. Arbitrariness consists of the establishment of 
where in the causal chain one stops searching for responsibilities. If moral responsibility is to 
be thought in proximal terms and in a specific context, it is only because certain punishments 
are fair or unfair only when one disregards the ultimate source of all blame. One may blame 
someone for not going to work because he fell asleep, but one cannot blame someone for not 
going to work because he is sick. Falling asleep does not depend on one's free will, just as 
being sick; however, responsibilities are very different in one case and the other. Someone 
may argue that he should have gone to sleep earlier the night before and that he should have 
set the alarm, but it is more intricate to build a story in which one should have avoided the 
disease. While both cases and elements are out of the agent's control, the story about 
responsibility will have the same shape: “had he done such thing and such other thing, 
then...”, the difference is that, in the case in which one falls asleep it works, but in the case of 
the disease it is more difficult for it to work.    
 If neuroscience or the laws of nature identify the descriptions of responsible actions 
with a more basic type of description, then one could very well eliminate the story of moral 
responsibility in favor of another kind of story, whose vocabulary will be comprised by the 
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physical properties of the brain. The problem with such eliminativism is whether it is possible 
to find said identification and, even if it is found, whether both stories serve the same 
function –assuming also that one is able to specify which function corresponds to moral 
responsibility.   
 Disregarding the eliminativist thesis, it is still difficult to estimate up to which point 
one should investigate in the causal chain, since one may investigate enough as to commit to 
the explanation of moral responsibility of our behaviors, just as one may investigate enough 
as to leave it aside. It is a matter of whether one should arrive to the sources that are out of 
one's control or not when causal explanations are sought. Imagine that Betty goes to the 
casino and she wins a lot of money, and then she decides to give half of that money to charity. 
Betty's decision may be said to be worthy of praise since she could have very well kept the 
money; and, at the same time, it may be said that it is a matter of luck, since she could have 
not won and she could have not had the possibility to give anything to charity. Therefore, 
there is a difference between, for instance, not being able to stop smoking and choosing to 
light up a cigarette for the first time. This difference persists even in a deterministic world. In 
the first case there is no control over the behavior; in the second case, one is assumed to 
choose. Regarding lighting up a cigarette for the first time, one can of course ask, to what 
extent is it really a choice? Lighting up a cigarette for the first time may be the consequence 
of peer pressure among colleagues (especially if one is talking about a teenager) plus a weak 
personality, etc. The answer to this kind of question is based on the idea that one is 
responsible for one's actions to the extent that, in the story that was built, some responsibility 
is taken, whether for oneself or for others.  
 Think about Milgram's (1963) famous experiment in which responsibility may lie in 
the authority of the scientist as well as in the "master" applying the discharge. Whoever 
applies the discharge may build a story that may exempt him from responsibility, while an 
16 
 
observer may arrive to the conclusion that his behavior is immoral. The "master" may claim 
that he was only obeying orders and that he trusted the authority of the scientist; he could also 
affirm that "they know what they are doing." However, the observer may claim that, in spite 
of the pressure of the scientist, the person applying the electric shock, as an autonomous 
being, should have behaved, ultimately, in a different way. Beyond the surprising results that 
arose from the experiment, the idea behind this point is to indicate that one may justify one's 
actions in many different ways and that responsibility is not a matter that is independent from 
the story.   
 No one knows if we are causally determined and, even if we are, the truth is that we 
behave and evaluate ourselves morally as if we were not. This is so even if the systematic 
approach of determinism, whether metaphysical, naturalistic or environmental, were 
believable
14
. For example, a drunken person behind the wheel has no control over his actions, 
but that does not mean that he is not responsible if he hits another person, even if the source 
of his alcoholism were child abuse. Regarding blame and punishment, the degree of control 
over our actions is supported by a close responsibility that is vital for evaluative attitudes. If 
responsibility depends on the rational construction that conceives the actions of the driver as 
intentional, it is due to the fact that said construction entails the desire of truth in a counter 
factual judgment: "he could have avoided drinking when he was supposed to drive." In such 
cases, responsibility lies in rules that seek to guarantee people's safety. Therefore, it does not 
entail the search for an ultimate level of control; in the end, completely indeterministic 
conclusions are considered in this search.  
 Moral responsibility is not only a product of the construction of the story of past 
actions, but also the ability to teleologically evaluate, as correct or incorrect, possible future 
actions. To a certain extent, one can know the future, inasmuch as possible worlds may be 
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represented and, from that, actions may be morally judged. Likewise, moral responsibility is 
also settled in the motivation of actions when they serve as a starting point for stories that 
predict future consequences with a certain degree of probability. This hope of achieving 
practical results that have been predicted guides most of our decisions. However, the ultimate 
consequence of our actions is a complete uncertainty, just as it is the ultimate cause of our 
actions.     
 Nevertheless, human behavior may be retrospectively evaluated by virtue of results 
that were not predicted by the agent and past explanations and causes may be constructed 
through actions or omissions so as no reproaches may arise, whatever the result may be. In 
fact, evaluative expressions may be justified inasmuch as they are characterized as intentional, 
even if they are not. Following Frankfurt (1969, 1971), there are circumstances in which 
coercion does not limit the responsibility of the agents. Frankfurt maintains the general idea 
that someone is capable of being morally evaluated, whether negatively or positively, for his 
performance, even if it was neither intentional nor deliberate.  
The actions not only include direct personal behavior, but also the results and the 
consequences of what was directly done. For instance, by pulling the trigger of a gun, one can 
predict a bullet shall be fired, and that it may kill someone. In that case, direct personal 
behavior consists of moving the hand and the finger with which one aims the gun and pulls 
the trigger. In fact, this may be the only event one tries to deliberately produce: one may not 
want to fire the bullet or that someone may be reached or fatally injured by the shot. However, 
the direct personal behavior of aiming the gun and pulling its trigger represents only a part of 
what, in fact, was done. There is another part that has to be taken into account and that refers 
to not analyzing the mediate or immediate future consequences of the action of holding a gun. 
When someone has a gun in their home he is responsible of omitting, as a future pertinent 
possibility, the fact that said gun may be accidentally fired.  
18 
 
 The story of moral responsibilities for actions or omissions is associated with the 
control over future consequences since, when the success of predictions is pointed out, the 
unspoken agreements with other agents that made it possible is omitted. The circumstances 
that condition the state of future things are trimmed in order to make the intention of the 
subject of the action more relevant. Therefore, taking the above mentioned example into 
account, one is responsible of not performing the action of considering as a future pertinent 
possibility the fact that the gun may be accidentally fired, even though that judgment is made 
a posteriori, since the person making that judgment constructs a story in which the subject of 
the action should have controlled the consequences of his actions.  
 Given that there are expectations that arise from the deliberation about future 
consequences, one may narrate the counterfactual aspects of one's actions and attribute 
intentionality to them. Consequently, S is responsible for a future action when he has the 
possibility to choose alternate actions that lead to other actions. Or he may rethink said action 
based on actions in order to arrive to the state of things: S is responsible, through one or 
several present actions, for a future state of things, when the consequence of the choice of his 
action is considered to be a relevant alternative. For instance, people who unload toxic waste 
into the catchment area of a river, even when it can be avoided, are responsible for the 
contamination of said catchment area in the future, if this consequence is considered to be, in 
the story, as a relevant alternative to the action (Campbell, 1997).  
 One is not able of teleologically evaluating every variable of one's decisions, although 
it is presumed that one is able of evaluating the more relevant ones. However, if this was so, 
should one not also be responsible for what one considers to be relevant?
15
 While 
ramifications of the effects of the action always exceed the foreseeable consequences, we are 
willing to apply intentional properties to unpredictable long term consequences. Therefore, 
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 One may even think of Kant, and that the impossibility of a correct evaluation of every effect of an action, 
that is to say, the impossibility of a complete teleological evaluation, gave rise to the categorical imperative.  
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the relevance of the possible consequences will also depend on the degree of interest of the 
agent in his counterfactual deliberations, without excluding that the particular values and the 
ability of the calculations may always lead to something unexpected (Cf. Mulligan, 2006)
16
. 
Consequently, due to the fact that there is no ultimate control over what is done since every 
action is not more than the development of a given thing, there is no moral responsibility in 
the profound sense of the term
17
. However, while the lack of an ultimate control of our 
actions and the degree of interest of the agent in predicting relevant future consequences 
cannot be defined, the story of moral responsibility assumes a compatibility that is partially 
inevitable since said stories are centered in the near control that should have been considered 
to be relevant. Even though a hardly profound type of responsibility is worth saving, the 
moral experience works because it is not based on theoretical reflections about its nature.    
 
5. Overall conclusions 
  Personal responsibility regarding one's own future, in order to achieve certain 
purposes, entails the responsibility regarding the future of others. Yet, even if one cannot 
control how others influence one's decisions, this does not mean that one is not the owner of 
or responsible for the success or failure of one's own decisions. Our stories about moral 
responsibility are fundamentally compatibilist since judgments on the attribution of 
responsibilities are based on the ability of producing counterfactual statements. In this sense, 
throughout this paper certain ambiguity among the distinction between the rules and moral 
responsibility can be noticed. However, this leap between one aspect and the other occurs 
since the evaluations on the description of what is is determined by the context, just as the 
evaluation or the acceptance of what must be. The reason for this is that moral reasons, 
whether they constitute a description or an evaluation criterion, are context-sensitive. In 
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  In fact, Nagel (1991) defended the notion that agents may be morally responsible for those actions they 
inadvertently produce or those actions that do not have an explicit intention. 
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 Such as Smilansky (2003) has maintained.  
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certain contexts, narratives concerning the ultimate causes of a piece of behavior are 
constructed. In other contexts, other narratives or stories with a more limited range of causes 
are built and interpreted. Thus, certain moral responsibility judgments are incompatibilist 
while others are compatibilist. 
 Different stories, some about what it is and about what must or should be, imply 
considerations, inquiries, and different depths when it comes to the evaluation of moral 
responsibility. Therefore, inquiries about the responsibility of the principal agent of the case 
reach deep speculations about his past, his genes, or whether he is determined to act in a 
different manner or not and, in other occasions, these depths are not reached; the 
responsibility is rather attributed only based on certain considerations about the will of the 
agent, his efforts and the recognition of the action as his own. Then, there are stories that 
place the subject in the place of someone who complies with certain normative standards in 
order to be responsible and there are stories that do not in spite of the action being the same
18
.    
  In other words, on the one hand, when it comes to looking for responsibilities, the 
causal chains stop at the near causes, both in relation to the reconstruction of the past and in 
relation to future consequences. The search for profound or long term causes is a matter of 
theoretical activity that has nothing to do with prizes and punishments in practice. On the 
other hand, if determinism were true, it would be possible to have enough knowledge so as to 
predict the shape of the future without failing. Yet, human beings lack the pertinent 
knowledge and the necessary intellectual abilities, which means that the fact that we are not 
able to predict the future constitutes no evidence of the falseness of determinism. It does 
evidence the possibility of compatibilism since, as the future is unknown, stories around the 
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 For instance, Sher (2009) has suggested that one is sensitive to the attributions of moral responsibility if the 
agent is conscious of the moral value of the action at the time in which he acts or not. On the other hand, others 
consider that it is his training or education and if those prevent his autonomy or not (e.g., Haji and Cuipers, 
2008).   
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agent's non-executed possibilities can be established, even if such speech is also determined.  
 The story with judgments on moral responsibility depends on the context of 
attribution. Like so, in a philosophical or theoretical context where the ultimate sources of our 
actions are sought, Betty may consider herself as not being responsible for her success, but in 
the practical context of our relationship with the world, Betty is responsible for her success. 
Therefore, if this notion is followed, moral responsibility is compatible with determinism. So, 
is it fair that Betty is rewarded for her decision? Is it fair that Benji is punished for his 
decision? The answer to both questions depends on the causal story one builds. If the causal 
demand is high, that is to say, that one tries to reach the ultimate source of the action, then it 
is possible to reach an explanation in which neither of them is responsible for the way they 
are. But this demand seems to be more philosophical or theoretical than practical. In the 
context of everyday life, the attribution of responsibility is quite simple whereas in more 
specific contexts, the search for responsibilities becomes more complicated. As one 
approaches the ultimate sources of responsibility, it dissolves among skeptical reflections.  
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